STATEMENT BY

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UNITED STATES ARMY
DIRECTOR OF TRAINING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
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Introduction

Chairman Shays, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss how the Department of the Army is incorporating lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan into the training and equipping of our Reserve and Guard units prior to deployment. The Army appreciates your continuing support of the men and women who make up our great Army as we conduct operations around the globe. As you know, the Reserve Components are integral to the Army and indispensable to a quality force. We cannot perform effectively for long without employing Army Reserve and Army National Guard forces and, accordingly, the Army is committed to serving all components by providing common doctrine, standard organizations, fielding and support for equipment, and shared opportunities for training and leader development.

Lessons Learned

- **The Challenge in Iraq and Afghanistan**

We can expect the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan to continue to challenge the persistence and perseverance of our Soldiers deployed there. Our forces face an adaptive threat that will continue to fight from the shadows without regard for conventional norms of warfare and will seek ways to undermine our resolve and support. The continuing readiness and effectiveness of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan depends in no small part upon our ability to analyze and quickly address lessons we learn there on a rapidly changing basis.

- **Gathering Lessons Learned**

We have expanded our available assets to identify, gather, categorize, and analyze operational lessons learned and to then rapidly develop and disseminate products associated with those lessons. The Center for Army Lessons Learned, known as CALL and established in Fort Leavenworth, KS, plays a central role in this process and is used as the central repository for lessons learned observations and associated tactics, techniques, and procedures. CALL employs a number of techniques to aggressively seek out lessons learned. It employs Combined Arms Assessment Teams, created using subject matter experts from Army schools and units, to closely examine specific issues in the field. It also employs study groups to examine operations; one was used to examine major combat operations in Iraq. Another is planned in June 2004 to examine subsequent operations. CALL embeds analysts within units employed in theater -- it currently has analysts embedded with Combined Joint TF-7 HQ in Iraq, Combined Joint TF-180 in Afghanistan, and with all Division HQs in Iraq. During major combat, CALL also embedded analysts with each US Army Division HQs. CALL is visiting and interviewing Wounded In Action patients in medical facilities in the continental Untied States to solicit their personal insights, observations, and 'what if' opinions. Finally, CALL provides an avenue for any individual or unit to submit unsolicited personal insights and observations based on their experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major Army Commands that provide forces to the Combatant Commander actively seek out lessons learned from returning units, report them to the consolidated CALL database, and adjust training for deploying forces accordingly.

CALL has a Joint Integration Cell. Presently the Joint Integration Cell consist of three individuals, headed by a CALL DA civilian team chief, a liaison officer from the Joint Staff, J7 (a contracted Joint Lessons Learned Specialist), and a liaison officer (COL/O6) from U.S. Joint Forces

Command Joint Center for Lessons Learned. Coordination and discussion between CALL the Joint Staff and Joint Forces Command regarding tactical and operational lessons learned is conducted daily. All formal Army joint lessons learned generated by CALL are vetted, approved and submitted to Joint Forces Command by the DA, DCS G3.

- **Processing Lessons Learned**

Regardless of the source, when received by CALL, lessons learned are categorized and processed as "Urgent" for immediate dissemination, as "Important" to follow-on forces, or as "Routine". Generally, CALL analysts in Iraq or Afghanistan distribute Urgent or Important lessons learned horizontally to other units and commands in-theater, before submitting them. However, the CALL analysts at Fort Leavenworth query the sender to ensure that this dissemination has taken place and take an aggressive role in seeing information is distributed quickly. Fort Leavenworth analysts then use email to disseminate both Urgent and Important level information to follow-on-force units down to brigade level and to Army Combat Training Centers, who train follow-on force units. Using classified email, operational lessons learned are routinely disseminated immediately to units already employed in theater and to those preparing to deploy. Additionally, lessons learned are posted into classified and unclassified CALL databases, which are accessible through the Internet and searchable by units Army-wide. Finally, CALL integrates lessons learned into CALL handbooks, newsletters, and Initial Impressions Reports; which are published periodically and disseminated to the force and the institutional Army.

- **Leveraging Lessons Learned**

Operational lessons learned are disseminated appropriately throughout the institutional Army and aggressively applied to follow-on-forces and institutional processes. The top priority for U.S. Army Training And

Doctrine Command doctrine development resources is publishing Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for deploying forces based on lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Newly published Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures are included in the CALL database and are available via the Internet to units Army-wide.

The Training and Doctrine Command also uses lessons learned to adjust instruction during initial military training and follow-on professional development courses. There are numerous examples: Basic Combat Training was adjusted for certain Military Occupational Specialties to include actual missions Soldiers may execute in theater, Fort Sill and Fort Benning offer examples of this training; the Officer Basic Courses have incorporated convoy operations and convoy defense classes, as well as reaction to improvised explosive devices and urban operations; and traditional weapons familiarization firing conducted by the Training and Doctrine Command was adjusted to include engaging targets at 150 meters and closer. The Training and Doctrine Command also is arranging for veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan to give mission-tailored instruction to officers and non-commissioned officers being assigned to deploying units. In sum, lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan have caused many adjustments to virtually all courses offered by the Training and Doctrine Command for officer and non-commissioned officer professional development and for officers assuming command at the battalion and brigade levels. As a result, our training base schools (both active and reserve) do a remarkable job of providing individuals and leaders with the foundation knowledge and skills they need to be adaptive and to think asymmetrically in today's complex contemporary operating environment – an environment where leaders at all levels, from sergeant through the general officer ranks, are faced with decisions that have significant impacts on the enemy, their unit's mission success, and the indigenous population.

- **Combat Training Centers**

Because training base schools must continue to provide competencies that Soldiers and leaders need to execute across the entire spectrum of operations, perhaps the main benefactors of lessons learned from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are the instituions that prepare forces for deployment.   Primary among these are the Army's Combat Training Centers.

As noted above, 'Urgent' and 'Important' lessons learned are fed immediately by the Center for Army Lessons Learned to the Combat Training Centers who use them to update training scenarios, the training environment, and opposing forces. The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence oversees the process for updating opposing forces at Combat Training Centers. In March 2004, he convened the 9th annual opposing force conference, whose theme was "Synchronizing the Worldwide Opposing Force Effort for Adaptive Threats." Opposing forces at maneuver Combat Training Centers now act 24 hours a day and present threats that Soldiers will likely experience in Iraq and Afghanistan; e.g., suicide bombers, terrorists, rifle-propelled grenades, and improvised explosive devices. At one center, opposing forces can now operate from caves and bunker complexes. All centers have increased civilian presence on the battlefield.

Similarly, as resources become available the Combat Training Centers are updating their capability to challenge units with Urban Operations.   The intention is that every Combat Training Center training event will continue to increase urban operations conditions for the training unit, complicated by the presence of civilian role players on the battlefield. Furthermore, when a Combat Training Center is used to provide a Mission Rehearsal Exercise for deploying forces, the center works within available resources to replicate the actual mission operating environment. Mission Rehearsal

Exercises are provided at live maneuver Combat Training Centers for brigades and below and at the Battle Command Training Program for brigade headquarters and above. The Battle Command Training Program works closely with CALL and units in theater to ensure mission rehearsal exercises are "current". A theater-focused Battle Command Seminar (an academic seminar) is conducted before each mission rehearsal exercise. A two-day urban operations seminar is conducted with all brigades prior to deployment. Because of time constraints, all Reserve Component maneuver brigade headquarters receive a combination urban operations / battle command seminar prior to their mission rehearsal exercise at a maneuver Combat Training Center. Mission rehearsal exercises make extensive use of Subject Matter Experts, of current in-theater personnel, and of the CALL database of lessons learned.

- **Direct Communications**

The information age has enhanced the ability for direct communication between personnel that have completed an operational rotation and those who are deploying for the same mission. Currently, Soldiers are using direct email and websites (both official and unofficial) to share information about recent experiences and informal lessons learned. Examples are companycommander.mil; XO/S3.mil; NCOTeam.org; FirstSergeant.com; Squad-Leader.com; and platoonleader.mil. The Army, as part of our Training Transformation effort, is working to establish a system of official sites and capabilities to support this individual sharing of information and learning and enable access to subject matter experts and other support mechanisms to create what we call network-centric learning. This learning goes beyond courses and extends to the individual in the context of their mission to create knowledge and distribute it. We are also working to enable knowledge sharing among individuals through establishing official communities of practice, communities of interest, and structured professional forums within a Battle Command Knowledge System.

Requirements to Solutions

- **Army Strategic Planning Board Process**

The Army Strategic Planning Board (ASPB) was established on 14 September 2001, with the charter to manage the Army's rapid transition to a wartime focus as well as sustain the Army's continuing contribution to the security of the Homeland and the Nation's war against terrorism.

The ASPB functions as an iterative and adaptive planning body to provide an integrating framework to organize and synchronize support for a global campaign, provide a bridge between national strategic guidance, national military guidance, and Major Command/Army Service Component Command plans and efforts, provide a linkage between near-term demands in the Year of Execution and Budget Year for resource realignment, and provide a framework for future planning and analysis that enables responsive risk mitigation.

In order to support the Combatant Commanders, the ASPB recommends solutions to immediate requirements, anticipates intermediate needs, and puts sound thought into future requirements to win this war and to remain postured to succeed in other contingencies.

When a unit identifies a need, they initiate an Operational Needs Statement in accordance with Army Regulation 71-9. The Operational Needs Statement is sent forward through the unit's chain of command for endorsement and is signed by the first General Officer in the chain of command. At this point, while the Operational Needs Statement continues formal staffing through the operational chain of command for assessment, an information copy is provided directly to HQDA, Requirements (DAMO-RQ) for an initial check to ensure the requested capability and operational concept is clearly stated.

Once the Operational Needs Statement has been endorsed and is received at HQDA, the requirements action officer begins working a solution to the requested capability. The action officer provides a holistic solution to the unit's requirement by identifying the equipment to meet the required capability and by coordinating all required support such as training, structure, prioritization of fill, and redistribution. Actions are generally staffed within 7-10 days.

Once the action officer has completed the staffing, he or she presents the recommended solution to the Council of Colonels (DA staff). The Council of Colonels meet each Tuesday and review all actions scheduled for the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 ASPB meeting on Wednesdays. Once briefed on the requirement and solution the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 provides a decision on the action.

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 receives validated requirements for equipment from the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3 and resources them to meet the needs of combatant commanders based on the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3's prioritization strategy. This strategy supports an equitable distribution of equipment in short supply. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 resources the Army and combatant commanders with equipment procured from production, depot stocks, and redistribution from across the Army. Another source of equipment used by the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 in resourcing commanders comes from existing stocks left in the theater of operations. Generally, this equipment is in high demand and low density.

If there are not enough quantities of the required equipment within the Army, the action is passed to Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology) who works through the contracting, testing, materiel, safety release, and waivers in an expedited manner in order to

provide the equipment. If the required equipment can be provided via redistribution of assets, the affected Major Army Commands coordinate the release of equipment in accordance with priorities established in the fielding plans.

The Deputy Chief of Staff, G3's decision is provided with the solution (resource) back through the operational chain of command to the unit. This accelerated process is generally completed within 1-2 months, whereas historically, it required 24-48 months.

Since its establishment, the Army Strategic Planning Board has developed recommendations for and has tracked over 500 discrete tasks in support of Combatant Commanders, obligated over $5.5 Billion to support the War on Terrorism effort, and synchronized the Department of the Army's and Major Commands' planning and execution of their Title 10 United States Code support for the War on Terrorism.

The Army's Rapid Fielding Initiative distributes a selected list of equipment to deploying Soldiers. The equipment list for this program currently includes items such as the Advanced Combat Helmet, weapons optics, improved boots, and other items that improve Soldiers' lethality, mobility, and force protection. Every Soldier deploying in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom receives this equipment either before leaving the continental United States or before employment while in theater.

Improvised Explosive Devices

The proliferation of Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) on the battlefield in both Iraq and Afghanistan has posed the most pervasive threat facing Coalition Forces in theater. The persistent effectiveness of this threat has

impacted unit operations, US policy and public perception. As a result, the Army Chief of Staff directed the Deputy Chief of Staff, G3 to form an IED Task Force to orchestrate Army efforts to defeat IED threats, recommend best available responses against IED threats, and direct the development and fielding of selected responses.

The IED TF was chartered to adopt a holistic approach focused on intelligence; tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP); Information Operations (IO); and the tenets of assured mobility (protection, prediction, detection, prevention, neutralization). The goal is to identify and neutralize the enemy leaders, suppliers, trainers, enablers, and executors responsible for the employment of IEDs against Coalition Forces. Achievement of this goal requires development of a full spectrum analysis of IEDs that considers and applies multiple materiel, doctrinal, and training strategies to effectively counter the IED threat.

An IED TF Senior Advisory Group has been formed to facilitate this process by bringing to bear the expertise of organizations both within the Army Staff and Major Commands, as well as our Joint and International partners. This multi-Service collaboration of senior subject matter experts coordinates support, identifies and assigns responsibilities, and leverages resources across the DOD spectrum. The Army would like to see this focused IED effort evolve into a single Joint Task Force supported by a similarly focused strategic resourcing board that provides necessary resourcing allocation and policy development to ensure that all available resources and technologies are leveraged in a coordinated campaign to defeat the IED threat.

The Deputy Director, Information Operations (G3, DAMO-ODZ) serves as the IED TF Director and the Director of the Rapid Equipping Force (REF) serves as the IED TF technical director and lead for evaluation and

assessment of all materiel solutions. The primary elements of the IED Task Force include an Operations Cell, Field Teams, a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) IED Cell, a National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) IED Group, an Evaluation and Integration Team, and CONUS Advisory Teams (CAT). Each of these elements has a specific role to play in providing the holistic response required to defeat the IED threat.

The Operations Cell, soon to be expanded with the addition of Army National Guard, Army Reserve and USMC personnel, coordinates all operational matters and provides common support functions to ensure effective connectivity between all Task Force elements. The key operational arm of the IED TF consists of the forward deployed Field Teams in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan. Chartered to perform on-the-ground observation, information collection and dissemination, and IED training in-theater, these teams assist in collecting technical, operational, and contextual details relating to IED events and provide an immediate and vital link to theater intelligence and operations.

The information collected by the Field Teams is disseminated, not only to the Coalition Explosive Exploitation Cell within the theater of operations, but also directly to the National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) IED Group, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) IED Cell, and the Evaluation and Integration Team. The NGIC IED Group collects and disseminates IED information and intelligence, develops collection plans for the Field Teams, and provides specific IED information and intelligence for evaluation, while the CALL IED Cell focuses on collecting tactics, techniques and procedures and lessons learned related to IEDs, with the goal of rapid dissemination of information to Army forces, institutional training organizations, and Joint organizations. The Evaluation and Integration Team prioritizes potential solutions, provides recommendations for technical solutions to be explored or expedited, and is proactive in

threat evaluations. As appropriate, requirements for acquisition and fielding of available technologies are coordinated through the Rapid Equipping Force (REF). In coordination with NGIC and the REF, the IED TF continually assesses and tests technical and tactical solutions to fill capability gaps, to identify the most effective systems and best employment methods, and to expedite TTP development. We are continually seeking all viable options, both low and high tech, to defeat the constantly evolving IED threat. The focus of this effort is to identify, test and field technologies that improve our abilities to predict, detect, prevent and neutralize IEDs while protecting the force. Potential material solutions are evaluated according to maturity level, capabilities provided and operational needs to prioritize them for rapid development and fielding. Technologies being explored include electronic counter measures, bio-metrics, detection technologies and protective systems.

While materiel solutions play an important part in defeating the IED threat, battlefield experience has validated the fact that Soldier and leader training is the most important factor in minimizing the effectiveness of the enemy IED effort. As battlefield lessons learned are assimilated, the IED TF focuses on providing training to our own forces in the most current tactics, techniques and procedures being used by the enemy, and the best available US tactics, techniques and procedures to eliminate the IED threat. A primary effort of the IED TF is to prepare Soldiers and units, Active, Guard and Reserve, during pre-deployment training to face the IED threat. The Center for Army Lessons Learned is helping the IED TF to develop videos and other training materials to assist in keeping Soldiers current on enemy and friendly IED tactics, techniques and procedures.

To disseminate IED tactics, techniques and procedures throughout the Army, from schoolhouse to the individual Soldier, the IED TF CONUS Advisory Teams have developed a counter-IED training strategy and

associated training task list as the basis for its multi-echelon pre-deployment training campaign. The IED CONUS Advisory Teams travel to deploying units as well as Army institutional organizations to provide IED awareness training briefings and materials to support unit training strategies. These teams provide commanders the resources to incorporate IED awareness training into their pre-deployment training plans at collective training sites, unit home stations and in institutional schoolhouse curriculum. Using tactics, techniques and procedures derived from the latest lessons learned, these traveling teams provide a multi-echelon training approach that includes a Senior Leadership Overview (division to corps leadership); Unit Leader Training (battalion and Brigade Commander and Command Sergeant Major); Battle Staff Training (battalion and brigade level); and, Individual Soldier Training. This multi-echelon training is designed for early infusion in the training process and refinement throughout the train-up period. Units identified for Operation Iraqi Freedom III and Operation Enduring Freedom IV are currently being scheduled for assistance visits, as well as the Combined Training Centers, mobilization stations, and Army schools responsible for preparing them to deploy.   A leave-behind component being developed for this program is a CD-based training package consisting of six modules designed to present current IED threat awareness and substantive training tips for Soldiers and leaders. Topics addressed by this product include defeating the IED threat to convoys, defeating vehicle-borne IEDs, battle drills training, and IED incident reporting. The efforts of the CONUS Advisory Teams (CAT) are closely integrated and synchronized with the Army's Combat Training Centers (CTC), Training Support Battalions (TSB) and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). This ensures that the latest counter-IED TTP are quickly assimilated in the Army's institutional training base curriculum, providing Soldiers across the force with the best tools available to defeat the IED threat.

The IED TF continues to pursue finding new ways of training Soldiers to recognize and deal with the IED threat, to disseminate the latest information on enemy and friendly IED TTPs, and to seek new doctrinal and technical solutions for eliminating the threat. To this end a classified web site (http://iedtaskforce.army.smil.mil) has been established where the latest information about the IED threat and the best counter IED strategies are posted for ready availability to commanders and trainers. To ensure timely and responsive support to theater operations the IED TF continues to mature its quick assessment capabilities, facilitated by its Field Teams in Kuwait, Iraq and Afghanistan.

The IED TF was created to provide a rapid and effective response to a new and deadly enemy threat capability. This threat is pervasive and likely to be a component of the war on terror for the foreseeable future. To counter this long-range threat, work has begun on establishment of a permanent Army organization to institutionalize the efforts of the IED TF, expanding its future operational capabilities to support all Combatant Commanders wherever an enemy asymmetric threat may be encountered. In conjunction with this initiative, the IED TF will continue to promote multi-Service and Joint participation, ultimately working toward establishment of DOD/Joint level oversight and synchronization of future counter IED programs.

Lessons Learned Shape Training Requirements for Deploying Forces
Army Major Commands that provide operational forces routinely update, in coordination with U.S. Army Central Command, their training guidance for Continental United States Active and Reserve Component units deploying to Iraq and Afghanistan. At Annex 1 is the current list of training tasks required by U.S. Army Forces Command for units deploying after 1 May 04. The updated training guidance identifies individual, leader, and collective training requirements for combat arms, combat service, and

combat service support units by echelon from squad/section/crew through division and includes training for combat and stability operations. Such lists are not all-inclusive, as commanders at any level may adjust tasks to this list to ensure their units are properly trained for their specific mission. Units use the websites maintained by the Center for Army Lessons Learned to refine their training.

Conclusion

Army processes for capturing lessons learned and providing solutions to employed and deploying forces is generally a success story. Ensuring that units receive lessons learned that apply to their mission is a daunting task, especially for some Reserve Component forces that have historically been resourced as part of the strategic reserve and have a higher preparation requirement to accomplish before deployments.

The major Army initiatives under taken by Chief of Staff, GEN Schoomaker, will go a long way toward enhancing the capability and readiness posture of both Active and Reserve Component forces as units rotate through operational deployments. Army efforts to rebalance the force will minimize involuntary mobilizations of Reserve Component forces within the first 30 days of a contingency and efforts to modularize the force with standardized formations will serve to establish better resource parity among rotating forces of all Components. Efforts to stabilize the force will provide predictability and mission-focus offered by unit life cycles. In all these efforts, the Army looks forward to continued Congressional support to achieve all these ends.

Annex 1. Forces Command Training Required by Deploying Forces

1. U.S. Forces Command units deploying to the Central Command Area of Operations after 1 May 04 will accomplish the training specified below before deployment.

2. **Theater Specific Individual Training**. Individuals deploying as part of a unit must be trained in the specific tasks below.

2.A. Country orientation brief to include a general overview of the political, military, cultural, religious, and economic conditions in the specific country. Information for this brief is obtainable at the CIA world fact book website at (www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html).

2.B. Anti-terrorism/Force Protection Training Level 1 Category 2 (medium to high threat area) IAW and to the standards stated in AR 525-13 appendix F. AR 525-13 may be accessed through the USAPA website: (www.usapa.army.mil/).

2.C. Rules Of Engagement Training IAW TC 7-98-1, Stability and Support Operations, Lesson 4: Rules of Engagement Application (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm). Specific rules of engagement (ROE) and specific instructions on use of deadly force will also be trained in theater.

2.D. Media Awareness Training IAW TC 7-98-1, Stability And Support Operations, Lesson 8: Media Strategy. (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm).

2.E. Weapons Qualification. Qualification with assigned weapon / weapon system IAW DA Pam 350-38 within 6 months prior to deployment date. Additionally, all units will ensure that Soldiers have been thoroughly trained on proper weapons clearing procedures IAW applicable operator and technical manuals.

2.F. NBC Personal Protective Measures.
2.F.1 (031-503-1035) Protect Yourself From Chemical/Biological Contamination Using Your Assigned Protective Mask
2.F.2 (031-503-1036) Maintain Your Assigned Protective Mask Replaces Task (031-503-1024, 1026)

2.G. First aid tasks to be trained.
2.G.1. Evaluate A Casualty (081-831-1000)
2.G.2. Prevent Shock (081-831-1005)
2.G.3. Give First Aid For Burns (081-831-1007)
2.G.4. Recognize And Give First Aid For Heat Injuries (081-831-1008)

2.G.5 (018-831-1032) Perform First Aid For Bleeding Of An Extremity replaces task (081-831-1016)
2.G.6. Put On A Tourniquet (081-831-1017)
2.G.7. (018-831-1032) Perform First Aid For Bleeding Of An Extremity replaces task (081-831-1017)
2.G.8. (081-831-1026) Perform First Aid For An Open Chest Wound replaces task (081-831-1015)
2.G.9. (081-831-1033) Perform First Aid For An Open Head Wound replaces task (081-831-1034)

2.H. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training. Units that do not fall into categories listed in paragraph 6d may use the DA IED TF website resources to assist in planning this training (see paragraph 4.b).

2.I. Complete Common Task Training on all CTT tasks identified in ATSC Test Bulletin, for the current training year.

2.J. Land Navigation Training.

2.K. Individual Movement Techniques.

2.L. Combat Lifesaver (CLS) Training. Goal is to have one CLS trained Soldier per squad, section or team.

2.M. Combat Stress And Suicide Prevention Training.

2.N. All regulatory briefings specified in applicable Army publications:
        General Orders
        OPSEC / SAEDA
        Law Of War
        Equal Opportunity And Prevention Of Sexual Harassment
        DA Fraternization Policy

3. **Theater Specific Leader Training**. Individuals in leadership positions, deploying as part of a unit, must be trained in tasks below. These are the minimum requirements to ensure individuals in leadership positions are trained for combat and stability operations. The level of leadership to which these tasks apply may vary. Not all apply to all levels of leadership nor must every leader understand the same level of detail. For example, Perform Risk Management is applicable at all levels; however, Plan And Conduct Urban Operations may be a higher-level training task. This list is not all-inclusive. Commanders at any level may add additional tasks as required.

3.A. Understand the military, political, cultural, economic, and religious environment. Brigade and division leaders are encouraged to attend the five-day cultural awareness seminar provided by the Jordanian peace operations center. Coordinate through FORSCOM G3 Training Division.

3.B. Utilize An Interpreter IAW CALL Handbook #04-7 Interpreters Operations.

3.C. Perform Negotiations IAW TC 7-98-1, Stability And Support Operations, Lesson 13: Negotiation.

3.D. Supervise Convoy Operations IAW TC 7-98-1, Stability And Support Operations, Lesson 7: Convoy Operations.

3.E. Employ Non-Lethal (NL) Capabilities IAW TC 7-98-1, Stability And Support Operations, Lesson 14: Temporarily Disabling Techniques/Technology.

3.F. Plan And Conduct Urban Operations (UO) IAW FM 3-06.11, Combined Arms Operations In Urban Terrain.

3.G. Supervise The Application Of The Rules Of Engagement (ROE) and Use The Graduated Response Matrix IAW TC 7-98-1, Stability And Support Operations, Lesson 4: Rules Of Engagement Application.

3.H. Conduct Casualty And Medical Evacuation IAW FM 8-10-6, Medical Evacuation In A Theater Of Operations.

3.I. Perform Risk Management In Support Of Mission IAW FM 100-14.

3.J. Supervise Traffic Control IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 16: Checkpoints

3.K. Cordon And Search IAW TC 7-98-1

3.L. Understand and/or develop unit SOPs that address: force protection postures, graduated response matrix, weapon readiness levels and security postures.

3.M. Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Training (See paragraph 4.B)

3.N. Crowd Control IAW FM 19-15 Chap 6 & 8

3.O. Combat Stress IAW FM 22-51 Chap 2, and Suicide Prevention training IAW DA Pam 600-24

3.P. Conduct Wheeled Vehicle Operator training IAW AR 385-55 and TC 21-305.

4. **General Collective Competencies**. Units should be trained to a P in competencies that are general in nature and inherent in a units normal duties and responsibilities. This requirement enables units to transition to offensive and defensive operations if needed. These include:

4.A. Gunnery and Live Fire Exercises. Meet the training readiness condition standards as prescribed by DA Pam 350-38, combat arms units will be qualified to Table XII standards. All CS/CSS units will conduct Collective Live-Fire Exercises (LFX), e.g. Convoy React To Ambush, Base Defense, etc. CSS LFXS will normally be conducted at platoon level. LFXs may be conducted at homestation, mobstation or at a combat training center and require AC OC/T validation.

4.B. Maneuver brigades will schedule level 1 thru level 4 DA TF IED briefings prior to start of collective training. MP and TC units exposed to significant IED threats will schedule level 1 to level 3 DA TF IED briefings. The DA IED TF has established a classified IED website which provides up-to-date information and lessons learned on IED operations. Briefing dates will be coordinated through CONUSAs or Corps to FORSCOM G3 Training. G3 Training POC is CPT Jesus Chong at DSN 367-5449 or LTC Ring DSN 367-6303. Additional training may be coordinated through the IED TF. HQDA POC is LTC Lutz (703) 697-5210 or SFC Lee (703) 697-0756 and units may get further information from SIPR website iedtaskforce.army.smil.mil

4.C. Common tasks related to the units normal mission that the commander determines the unit needs to train on (i.e. an engineer platoon must be proficient in the collective tasks needed to perform the duties normally expected of an engineer platoon).

4.D. Mission essential tasks focused on offensive and defensive operations at the platoon level with battalion level staff proficiency in TF command and control tasks. Training tasks are identified below by echelon. The more complex tasks are defined by several sub-tasks.
4.D.1. Combat Arms
4.D.1.A. Team/Squad
  - Team/Squad Movement (07-3-1180, 07-3-1270, 07-3-1279)
  - Attack (07-3-1009, 07-3-1000)
  - Conduct Link Up (07-3-1081)
  - Patrolling (07-3-1108, 07-3-1153)
  - MOUT (07-3-1279, 07-3-1406, 07-3-2036, 7-3-1000)
  - Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (07-3-5036)
  - React To Sniper (07-3-1406)

4.D.1.B. Platoon
 - Conduct Troop Leading Procedures (07-3-5036)
 - Conduct Maneuver (07-3-1180, 07-3-1270, 07-3-1279)
 - Cross Danger Area (07-3-1189)
 - Attack (07-3-1009)
 - Action On Contact (07-3-1423)
 - Breach Obstacle (07-3-1027)
 - Break Contact (07-3-1054)
 - Knock Out Bunker (07-3-13333)
 - Assault Building (07-3-1000)
 - Clear Trench (07-3-1036)
 - Convoy Operations (07-3-1225)
 - Conduct MOUT (07-3-1279, 07-3-1406, 07-3-2036)
 - React To Sniper (07-3-1406)
4.D.1.C. Company
 - Convoy Operations (07-2-1198 *, 07-2-1279, 07-2-1450, 07-2-1486,
      07-2-2009)
 - Employ QRF (07-2-1387)
 - Cordon And Search (07-2-1045, 07-2-1027)
 - Defend (07-2-1045)
 - Attack (07-2-1000, 07-2-1256)
 - Guard/Counter Recon (07-2-1063
 - Support By Fire (07-2-3000)
 - Conduct Breach (07-2-1477)
 - Conduct MOUT (07-2-2054, 07-2-1261, 07-2-1351, 07-2-1378,
      07-2-2054)
 - Establish And Operate Cp (07-2-5090, 07-2-5135, 07-2-2032)
 - Conduct Light/ Heavy Operations IAW FM 7-10, App-B
4.D.1.D. Battalion
 - Conduct Command And Control Operations (07-1-5027)
 - Defend In Sector (07-1-1027)
 - Deliberate Attack (07-1-1171)
 - Movement To Contact (07-1-1072)
 - Plan Operations Using The MDMP (07-5189)(Inf Bn/Tank And Mech Inf
      Bn Task Force) From Chapter 2 Of ARTEP 71-2-MTP
 - Plan, Integrate & Conduct Ground & Air Operations (07-1-5009,
      07-1-5018, 07-1-5135, 07-1-5190 *, 07-1-5135, 07-1-5162)
4.D.1.E. Brigade
 - Conduct Command And Control Of Operations (07-2-1604)
 - Plan Operations Using The MDMP (17-01-0005.07)
 - Plan, Integrate & Conduct Ground & Air Operations (17-1-0005.07,
      17-1-0007.07, 17-1-3808.07, 44-1-1050.07, 71-6-6006.07)
4.D.1.F. Division
 - Conduct Command And Control Of Operations (07-2-1604)
 - Plan Operations Using The MDMP (17-01-0005.07)
 - Plan, Integrate & Conduct Ground & Air Operations (17-1-0005.07,

17-1-0007.07, 17-1-3808.07, 44-1-1050.07, 71-6-6006.07)

4.D.2. Combat support/combat service support units must be proficient in METL tasks at level organized with staffs competent in MDMP.

4.D.2.A. Battalions And Groups
  - Conduct Command And Control Of Operations (07-2-1604)
  - Plan Operations Using The MDMP (17-01-0005.07)
  - Conduct Information Operations (IO) IAW FM 3-13
      (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-13/fm3-13.htm)

5. **Stability Operations Collective Competencies**. Units must be trained to at least a P in the competencies CJTF-7 has identified as having significant relevance to units conducting stability and support operations (SASO). Again, EAD and EAC units need to train on SASO tasks they are reasonably expected to perform. Commanders should use results of pre-deployment site surveys (PDSS) and coordination with units being relieved to develop mission specific training requirements. Units will train these tasks to the standards indicated in applicable field manuals.

5.A. Squad/platoon level stability operations specific competencies.

5.A.1. Traffic Control Point Operations IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 16: Checkpoints (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)

5.A.1.A. Conduct A Personnel Search

5.A.1.B. Conduct A Vehicle Search

5.A.2. Observation Post Operations IAW FM 7-98, Chapter 4, (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/f798.htm)

5.A.3. Convoy Operations IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 7: Convoy Operations (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm) (platoon only)

5.A.4. Quick Reaction Force Operations IAW unit SOP (platoon only)

5.A.5. Cordon And Search Operations IAW, FM 3-06.11, Chapter 14 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm) (platoon only)

5.A.6. Urban Operations IAW FM 90-10-1 FM 3-06.11 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm) (platoon only)

5.B. Company Level Stability Operations Specific Competencies.

5.B.1. Convoy Operations IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 7: Convoy Operations (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-in/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)

5.B.2. Quick Reaction Force Operations IAW unit SOP

5.B.3. Cordon And Search Operations IAW, FM 3-06.11, Chapter 14 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm)

5.B.4. Urban Operations IAW FM 3-06.11 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-06.11/toc.htm). The commander determines which tasks the unit is to train on during mission analysis.

5.B.5. Establish And Operate A Company Command Post IAW FM 71-1

5.C. Battalion/Task Force Level Stability Operations Specific Competencies.

5.C.1. Liaison With Outside Agencies IAW FM 7-98
5.C.2. Plan, Command And Control Quick Reaction Force Operations IAW unit SOP.
5.C.3. Force Protection IAW AR 525-13 (www.usapa.army.mil/) and TC 7-98-1, Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.C.4. Convoy Operations IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 7, Convoy Operations (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.C.5. Media Relations IAW TC 7-98-1, Lesson 8, Media Strategy (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.C.6. Coordination Of Conventional And Special Operations Forces IAW FM 7-20, Appendix D.

5.D. Task Force/Brigade Level Stability Operation Specific Competencies.
5.D.1. Force Protection IAW AR 525-13 (www.usapa.army.mil/) and TC 7-98-1, Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.D.2. Liaison With Coalition Forces And Outside Agencies IAW FM 7-98 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/f798.htm)
5.D.3. Information Operations (IO) IAW FM 3-13 (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-13/fm3-13.htm). This includes:
- IO Considerations/Fundamentals In Urban Operations and SASO
- Prepare IO Section For Deployment
- IO Capabilities In OIF
- Develop/Provide IO Input Into IPB
- Provide IO Input To The Deliberate Planning Process
- Provide IO Input To Crisis Planning
- Conduct Effects Based Targeting For IO
- Cultural Considerations In IO Planning/ Execution
- Establish The Information Operations Working Group (IOWG)

5.E. Division/Corps Level Stability Operation Specific Competencies.
5.E.1. Force Protection IAW AR 525-13 (www.usapa.army.mil/) and TC 7-98-1, Lesson 10, Antiterrorism Measures (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/tc/7-98-1/toc.htm)
5.E.2. Liaison With Coalition Forces And Outside Agencies IAW FM 7-98 (www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/7-98/f798.htm)
5.E.3. Information Operations (IO) IAW FM 3-13 (http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm/3-13/fm3-13.htm).
This includes:
- IO Considerations/Fundamentals In Urban Operations And SASO
- Prepare IO Section For Deployment
- IO Capabilities In OIF
- Develop/Provide IO Input Into IPB
- Provide IO Input To The Deliberate Planning Process

- Provide IO Input To Crisis Planning
- Conduct Effects Based Targeting For IO
- Cultural Considerations In IO Planning/ Execution
- Establish The IO Working Group (IOWG)
5.E.4. Civil Military Operations (CALL Newsletter 03-23 Sep 2003)

5.F. Minimum SASO tasks EAD and EAC units should train on. Tasks listed in paragraphs 5.A.1. to 5.A.3., 5.B.1., 5.B.5., 5.C.1., 5.C.3., 5.C.5., and 5.C.6.

6. **Exercises And Training Venues**.

6.A. Units will participate in a capstone exercise to demonstrate proficiency in the combat and SASO collective tasks in paragraphs 4 and 5 above.

6.B. Maneuver brigades will conduct MDMP staff training focused on command and control operations (paragraph 4) in either a CPX or FTX. CSG/ASG/CSB units will ensure that staffs are fully trained to track mission status in their area and to coordinate with subordinate units. Participation in a SIMEX as means for integrating entire staff prior to deployment is recommended where feasible but is not mandatory.

6.C. Maneuver brigades will conduct leader and staff training focused on urban operations in SASO in a LTP type event conducted by BCTP. Maneuver brigades schedule and conduct urban operations seminar through BCTP. Training audience is brigade commanders and staffs. Events described here and in paragraph 6.b may be combined.

6.D. Division and above commanders and staffs need to include increased IO and CMO into warfighter exercise scenarios to better prepare for deployment into theater.

7. **Coordinating Instructions**.

7.A. Divisions tasked to provide maneuver brigades as follow-on forces for OIF will provide their training plan thru their corps to FORSCOM. Plans shall include the timing and location of major events, resources required that the parent corps cannot provide, training tasks/events that cannot be conducted due to time/resource constraints, and an operational risk assessment based on training that cannot be conducted of the brigade s ability to conduct the mission.

7.B. All brigade sized units and above need to conduct a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS), if possible, prior to start of collective training for leaders and staffs to determine first hand requirements for their units. All

units will report PDSS dates to FORSCOM G3 Training And Operations for situational awareness. Any follow-on PDSS will also be reported. Units should attempt to conduct the PDSS with the unit they are replacing or in the area they will be operating within.